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Cross-National Sources of Regulatory Policy-Making 
in Europe and the United States
Giandomenico Majone
European University Institute, Florence, Italy 
1. Introduction
The ability of policy makers to innovate often depends more on 
their skill in utilizing existing models than on inventing novel 
solutions. In order to understand this apparent paradox it is 
helpful to think of policy innovation as the outcome of a dual 
process of conceptual variation and subsequent selection by 
political actors from the pool of policy variants. The locus of 
conceptual innovation is the community of academic, governmental 
and other experts who share an active interest in a certain 
policy area; the locus of selection is the political arena 
(Majone, 1989b; 161-166).
The two processes of variation and selection are separated by 
a time lag which may be of several years or even decades. Because 
events occur too fast and ideas mature too slowly for responses 
to be devised anew for each pressing problem, policy makers must 
usually select their ideas from the stock that happens to be 
available at a given time, and these are usually the results of 
intellectual efforts and practical experiences of preceding years 
(Derthick and Quirk, 1985, 57). Thus, the existing pool of 




























































































defining the range of conceptual alternatives from among which 
they can choose.
Which policy ideas or variants are likely to be selected? 
Several criteria are relevant to the choice, but the crucial one 
is the criterion of feasibility. The idea must be shown to be 
implementable, and given the difficulties of social 
experimentation the most persuasive proof is successful 
implementation in some country or jurisdiction not too different 
from that of the policy maker. This need to find reassurance as 
well as inspiration in concrete historical experience rather than 
in abstract theories explains why the number of essentially 
distinct variants in a given policy field is a good deal more 
limited than one could a priori expect.
In looking for models to imitate rather than seeking 
originality, political actors behave like economic actors who in 
their pursuit of profit often follow the pricing or marketing 
leadership of successful enterprises. Imitation affords relief 
from the necessity of searching for optimal decisions and 
conscious innovations which, if wrong, expose the decision maker 
to severe criticism. According to evolutionary economics, the 
strategy of adopting patterns of action observable in past 
successes instead of searching for novel solutions, may be quite 
rational in a complex and uncertain environment. Even innovation 
can be accounted for by imitation; in their imperfect attempt to 
imitate others, economic actors sometimes unconsciously innovate 




























































































circumstances prove partly responsible for the success (Alchian, 
1977, 28-30).
Of course, imitating is not the same as copying. The critical 
question in intelligent imitation, as in any other kind of 
lesson-drawing, is whether a programme or policy that is 
successful in one setting can be transferred to another (Rose, 
1990). However, there may be good reasons why policy makers often 
seem to be only mildly preoccupied with the problem of 
transferability. They know that any policy idea, whether original 
or derived, is bound to be modified by the concrete political and 
institutional conditions in which it is carried out. What the 
policy makers want, therefore, is less a detailed blueprint, 
which is indeed likely to be inapplicable to the specific 
conditions in which they operate, than general guidance and prima 
facie evidence that the proposed policy is feasible.
In this paper I shall examine several cases of policy 
innovation where the influence of foreign models is quite clear. 
The area chosen is that of economic and social regulation. The 
reasons for this choice have been nicely expressed by Rancher and 
Moran (1989, 285):
The most casual acquaintance with any 
important substantial area of regulation 
soon reveals that institutions and rules 
are widely imitated ... Since regulation 
is typically begun under pressure of 
time, or in conditions of crisis, the 
incentive to imitate is great. The result 
is that "early" regulators often provide 
a model for countries following later 
along the regulatory road ... [I]t is 




























































































countries exercising great economic and 
political power are most likely to be the 
objects of emulation.
The last observation explains the American influence on 
regulatory policy making in Europe since the end of the war. By 
the same token, the growing economic and political power of the 
European Community (EC) should lead to greater influence of EC 
regulation not only on the member states, but also on other 
countries such as the United States and Japan. In the last part 
of this paper I shall argue that this is precisely what is ■ 
happening.
The cases examined in the following pages —  the development 
of competition policy in Europe in the 1950s, the growth of EC 
regulation in the 1960s and 1970s, the deregulation movement of 
the 1980s, the likely impact of "Europe 1992" on American banking 
regulation —  should not be seen in isolation, but as different 
stages of a single process: the rise of the regulatory state in 
Europe.
2. The Growth of Regulation in Europe
In the following pages we shall examine two major sources of 
influence on the regulatory policies of EC countries. American 
regulatory philosophy and practice has been particularly 
influential in three distinct periods: during the formative years 
of the Community; in the 1970s, the period of development of 




























































































The influence of Community regulation has been constantly 
growing since the early 1960s. Today the impact of EC regulations 
and directives on practically every aspect of the social and 
economic life of the member states is acknowledged even by the 
most ardent advocates of national sovereignty.
To appreciate the significance of both influences, one must 
keep in mind the far-reaching changes in the relation between the 
state and the market that have taken place in Western Europe 
since the end of World War II, but especially during the last 
fifteen years. What is happening in Eastern Europe today 
represents in certain respects a recapitulation, in much more 
dramatic form, of developments that have also taken place, 
through gradual democratic processes, in the western half of the 
continent. If this is true, the trends identified below will 
eventually assert themselves also in the countries of Eastern 
Europe.
Economic and social policies in the decades immediately 
following the end of World War II were legitimized by the 
widespread belief that government could control the economy by 
manipulating key macroeconomic variables and, at the same time, 
ensure social justice and greater equality in the distribution of 
wealth. But full employment and the welfare state could be 
maintained only as long as the economy was expanding. The 
stagflation of the 1970s showed that growth could not be taken 
for granted. Keynes was proclaimed dead: monetarism and supply- 




























































































crisis of the welfare state came to be seen as part of the 
general crisis of socialism. The rejection of demand management 
and "fine tuning" implied the rejection of more direct forms of 
intervention in the economy: nationalizations, municipalizations, 
national and regional planning. Important sectors of public 
opinion, not only at the right end of the political spectrum, 
tended to view the state less as the solution than as one of the 
obstacles that impeded the adjustment of the European economies 
to far-reaching changes in technology and in the world economy.
However, scepticism in the ability of the state to act as 
planner, entrepreneur, employer of last resort, and provider of 
services which the market or nonprofit organizations could 
produce more efficiently, did not lead to demands for a return to 
laissez-faire, as the more radical advocates of privatization and 
deregulation seemed to expect. Rather, what was demanded were 
better focused and more flexible forms of public intervention, 
and more attention to those areas of social regulation 
(environment, consumer protection, civil rights) which had been 
largely neglected by the welfare policies of the past.
Thus, paradoxically, the debate on privatization and 
deregulation contributed to directing the attention of European 
public opinion to regulation as a distinct mode of policy-making 
aimed at correcting specific types of market failure (monopoly 
power, negative externalities, inadequate or asymmetrically, 
distributed information) but also at protecting non-commodity 




























































































privatization would only mean the replacement of public by 
private monopolies unless the privatized companies were subjected 
to public regulation of profits, prices and entry conditions.
Of course, the interventionist policies of the past had 
attempted to solve many of the same regulatory problems; but the 
traditional solutions tended to be much less precise than those 
suggested by a regulatory approach. For example, nationalization 
or municipalization has been in most countries of Europe the 
functional equivalent of American-style regulation in such key 
areas as transportation, telecommunications, and public 
utilities. However, the purpose of public ownership was not 
simply to control rates or conditions of entry but also to 
achieve a variety of other goals such as economic and technical 
development, income redistribution or national security. Consumer 
protection —  the most important objective of public regulation, 
at least in theory —  was usually sacrificed to other objectives.
Even when some of the same techniques of American-style 
regulation have been used —  for example, entry and price 
regulation, standard setting or licensing —  there has been a 
general reluctance to rely on specialized, single-purpose (or 
single-industry) regulatory commissions or agencies. Instead, 
regulatory functions have been assigned to traditional ministries 
or inter-ministerial committees. Important regulatory decisions 
are often taken at cabinet level and thus effectively protected 




























































































The mixing of regulatory and broader policy objectives, the 
absence of specialized agencies, the prevalence of informal 
procedures —  compared, for example, with the procedural 
requirements laid down by the U.S. Federal Administrative 
Procedure Act for formal adjudication by regulatory bodies — , 
the delegation of important regulatory functions to private or 
semi-private bodies like the German Berufsgenossenschaften and 
various national institutes for technical standardization: these 
are some of the factors which explain the low visibility of 
regulatory policy-making in Europe.
The political and institutional implications of the change 
from a broadly interventionist to a regulatory mode of policy 
making can be seen most clearly in the privatization policies of 
the Thatcher government (see also section 6 below). Paralleling 
the sale process of industries such as British Telecommunications 
and British Gas has been the development of a whole new 
regulatory structure. (Veljanovski, 1987, 165-170). This 
structure rests on a body of economic law involving a large 
number of specific obligations and license conditions placed on 
the privatized industries, and on a new breed of regulatory' 
agency —  the regulatory offices or ROs.
The ROs combine a number of functions: they administer price 
regulation; they ensure that the privatized firms comply with the 
terms of their licences; they act as a channel for consumer 
complaints and as promoters of competition in.the industry they 




























































































the Office of Fair Trading and to the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission (MMC).
Thus, privatization has led to a considerable widening of the 
scope of the competition agencies. Now the MMC has a direct role 
in the regulation of the utilities, while prior to privatization 
it did not have the possibility to examine the potentially anti­
competitive practices of the nationalized industries. Regulation 
of the competitive behaviour of the privatized industries is 
further strengthened by the availability of EC competition law 
which offers considerably more powerful remedies than are 
available under British laws (ib., 173).
In short, privatization has not meant a return to laissez- 
faire. Instead, it has changed the role of the state from being a 
producer of goods and services to that of a regulator whose main 
function is to ensure that economic actors play by the agreed 
rules of the game. The American influence is evident in the new 
institutional arrangements, despite some complaints that the 
American model of regulation has not been considered in 
sufficient detail. For example, many important regulatory powers 
have been given to the central government rather than to bodies 
operating at "arm's length". Where independent regulatory 
agencies have been established, as in telecommunications and 
gas, the Secretary of State retains important powers and the 
operation of the regulatory body is dependent on prior decisions 
of the minister concerning the principles to be applied. It has 




























































































agencies are far more open and participatory than anything 
considered in the United Kingdom (Prosser, 1989, 138-142).
These criticisms may be theoretically justified, but as.was 
noted above, and as we shall see in several other cases, foreign 
models are never literally copied; they provide inspiration, 
reassurance and perhaps justification, rather than detailed 
blueprints. Given the long tradition of secrecy and centralized 
decision making of the British as of most other European 
governments, one is inclined to accept the view of scholars like 
Veljakovski who argue that the changes brought about by the 
Thatcher government in the regulatory field have been 
considerably more dramatic than could have been expected and than 
many have conceded (Veljakovski, 1987, 186).
The British regulation of public utilities is only one 
example among many of the influence of American regulatory theory 
and practice on European policy makers since the war. In the 
following sections we shall discuss other significant examples. 
Before doing so, however, let us try to specify more closely the 
basic characteristics of American regulation. This may be useful 
for European readers, since many European scholars understand 
regulation in a very broad sense which sometimes covers the whole 
realm of legislation, governance, and social control.
Within the framework of American public policy and 
administration, regulation has acquired a more specific meaning. 
It refers, to use Philip Selznick's formulation, to sustained and 




























































































are socially valued (Selznick, 1985, 363-64). The reference to 
sustained and focused control by a public agency suggests that 
regulation is not achieved simply by passing a law, but requires 
detailed knowledge of, and intimate involvement with, the 
regulated activity. This requirement will necessitate, sooner or 
later, the creation of a specialized agency entrusted with fact­
finding, rule-making, and enforcement.
The emphasis, in Selznick's definition, on socially valued 
activities excludes, for example, most of what goes on in the 
criminal justice system: the detection and punishment of illegal 
behavior is not regulation in the sense in which the term is used 
here. On the other hand, market activities can be "regulated" 
only in societies that consider such activities worthwhile in 
themselves and hence in need of protection as well as control. In 
fact, the main difference between the American and the European 
approach to regulation in the past has been ideological rather 
than institutional. The American rejection of nationalization as 
a politically or economically viable option expressed a widely 
held belief that the market works well under normal circumstances 
and should be interfered with only in clearly defined cases of 
market failure. In this view, regulation is primarily a tool to 
increase economic efficiency; distributive aims should be pursued 
by other means.
As many recent studies have shown, the market-failure 
rationale is insufficient to explain the actual development of 




























































































explain in efficiency terms price and entry regulation of 
basically competitive industries like airlines, trucking, 
banking, and telephone services? Still, the success of the 
deregulation movement in many of these industries shows how 
important the ideological acceptance of the superior efficiency 
of the market economy has been, and still is, as a normative 
basis of public regulation in America. In Europe, on the other 
hand, popular acceptance of the market ideology is a more recent 
phenomenon. Peter Jenkins exaggerates only slightly when he 
writes that only now, for the first time in this century, the 
governing classes of Europe no longer assume that socialism in 
some form is what history has in store (Jenkins, 1988).
3. The Beginnings of Anti-Trust Legislation in the European 
Community
Actually, the reconstruction of the ideology and institutions of 
liberal capitalism started at the same time as the physical 
reconstruction of the continent after the war. As Charles Maier 
(1978, 23-48) has argued in his study of American international 
economy policy since 1945, Washington's successful effort in 
Europe , as in Japan, was to ensure the primacy of economics over 
politics, to de-ideologize issues of political economy into' 
questions of output and efficiency.
Not surprisingly, the Paris Treaty establishing the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 rejected the option of 




























































































means of production in coal, iron and steel in favor of a common 
market in these products achieved by removing custom duties, 
quotas, and other obstacles to free trade.
It is well known that the anti-cartel clauses of the ECSC 
treaty —  which Jean Monnet considered to be "the first European 
anti-trust law" —  were significantly influenced by the American 
model represented by the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Clayton Act 
and the Federal Trade Commission Act.
Washington, represented by J.McCloy and his cartel expert 
Robert Bowie of Harvard, insisted more than once on a particular 
wording of individual articles (Berghahn, 1986, 144). Monnet was 
familiar with American antitrust legislation and there are, in 
fact, striking similarities between his original draft of the 
treaty, which envisaged a general ban on cartels without 
exceptions, and the principles of American competition policy.
It is interesting to note that despite these influences and 
pressures, the anti-cartel clauses of the ECSC treaty were not an 
exact copy of the American model. Elements of the European cartel 
tradition survive in the treaty, even if in covert form. Thus, 
Article 65 bans agreements and practices which restrict or 
distort competition in the common market for coal and steel. 
Similarly, Article 66 follows the American example in prohibiting 
the formation of monopolies, but not concentrations short of 
monopoly. However, the High Authority could, in certain 
circumstances, permit horizontal agreements in order to improve 




























































































Moreover, Articles 59 and 61 endow the High Authority with 
interventionist powers in crisis situations. We may conclude with 
Volker Berghahn (1986, 144-45) that the governments of Western 
Europe were not prepared to rely completely on the mechanisms of 
competition.
Competition rules occupy an important position also in the 
1957 Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community 
(EEC). Article 3 (f) of the treaty calls for "the institution of 
a system ensuring that competition in the Common Market is not 
distorted". Articles 85-94 provide the foundation for the 
competition or antitrust policy of the Community. The competition 
rules are directed both against private companies and against 
national governments. Not surprisingly, the EC Commission has had 
greater success with respect to the former than the latter.
Policy towards private companies is controlled by Articles 85 
and 86. Article 85 prohibits vertical or horizontal agreements 
between enterprises that by their restrictive nature are liable 
"to affect trade between member states and have as their object 
or effect the distortion of competition within the Common 
Market". Article 86 refers to the prevention of abuses by 
enterprises which have a dominant position within the market.
Both articles have been significantly influenced by the 
American antitrust experience. Legal scholars have pointed out 
the remarkable similarity existing between Articles 1 and 2 of 
the Sherman Act and Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome. 




























































































as in the case of the Paris treaty creating the ECSC. For 
example, the power to control mergers is explicit in the ECSC 
treaty (along the lines of the anti-merger section of the Clayton 
Act), but not in the Treaty of Rome. Article 86 of this treaty is 
a poor instrument to control mergers since it requires a firm to 
be in a dominant position before it can be invoked. An explicit 
merger control regulation has been approved by the EC Council 
only at the end of 1989, becoming effective as of September 1990. 
After that date all mergers and acquisitions having a "Community 
dimension" will have to give notification to the EC Commission 
for clearance.
One important reason for the disparity between the two 
treaties was the changing motivation for a competition policy. 
Initially, under pressure from the United States, the major 
objective was to ensure that in the new coal and steel market the 
potential of large German firms would continue to be controlled 
along the lines of the allied policy of déconcentration. Strict 
competition rules reflected the political objective of preventing 
a revival of trusts and cartels in German heavy industry. By the 
mid-1950s fears of a resurgent Germany had diminished. The new 
climate of opinion combined with a lack of enthusiasm for strong 
supranational powers to produce the rather weaker competition 
rules of the EEC Treaty (Allen, 1983, 212).




























































































American influence was particularly strong and direct in an 
occupied country like Germany. Even before the war was over, a 
broad consensus had emerged in Washington that German cartels had 
to be abolished and that monopolistic or quasi-monopolistic 
market positions like that held by IG Farben, were to be broken 
up. The German cartel system was blamed for having contributed to 
the development of the Nazi closed-space economy. Such an economy 
directly contradicted the American vision of an international 
liberal order based on free trade and competition.
After the war, at the insistence of the Americans, all German 
cartel agreements were declared null and void, and a strict ban 
was promulgated which imposed heavy penalties on future 
violations of the cartel prohibition. The problem, however, was 
how the Germans would organize their economy at the end of the 
regime of military occupation. Understandably, the Americans were 
reluctant to leave the drafting of a future anti-cartel law to 
the Germans who were known to be keen to rebuild horizontal 
agreements. Therefore, the task of the decartelization branch of 
the Bipartite Control Office (BICO) was not merely to supervise 
the ban on cartels, but also to convince West German 
industrialists of the benefits of the American model and to 
persuade them to adopt it. For this reason the decartelization 
branch was not to be dissolved after the foundation of the 
Federal Republic but would continue to function in an advisory 




























































































Discussion on a German anti-cartel law began in the autumn of 
1949. By early 1950 rumors were circulating in Bonn to the effect 
that the allies, under pressure from the U.S. High Commissioner, 
would promulgate their own anti-cartel law if the Germans did not 
produce a satisfactory bill pretty soon. The American staff in 
the decartelization branch of the High Commission was headed by a 
former member of the Boston office of the Antitrust Division of 
the US Department of Justice; his deputy had been moved to 
Germany from the Securities and Exchange Commission. Thus, the 
German government was constantly faced with the real possibility 
of American intervention based on occupation law.
Ludwig Erhard, who as minister of the economy had the 
responsibility for drafting the law, did not have first-hand 
knowledge of American anti-trust theory and practice. However, 
early visits to the United States had convinced him of the 
superior productivity and dynamism of the American economic 
system. These visits strengthened his determination to introduce 
a similar legal framework in the Federal Republic. In December 
1949 it was decided to send a delegation of experts to America in 
order to study the application of anti-trust legislation and its 
effect on the economy. The group was accompanied in the United 
States by two former members of the Antitrust Division of the 
Department of Justice and met with representatives of the Federal 
Trade Commission, the Antitrust Division and the Securities and 





























































































Upon their return to Europe, the group produced a sixty-page 
report which gave a detailed description of the American system. 
This and similar visits by high civil servants, academics and 
industry representatives produced a body of expertise on American 
antitrust regulation on which Erhard and his advisors could draw 
in preparing successive versions of the German bill. The various 
drafts were discussed with members of the legal department of the 
U.S.High Commission, but these were not particularly impressed by 
the progress Erhard and his experts were able to make against the 
strong opposition of important sectors of German industry. At one 
point, an American expert voiced his "impression of a bill to 
facilitate cartels rather than one to ban them" (Berghahn, 1986, 
171).
At the end of November 1952, the experts of the High 
Commission sent to the German government a draft which was based 
on the German submission but contained a number of more radical 
clauses inspired by U.S. antitrust laws. Erhard had the difficult 
task of mediating between the American insistence on a strict ban 
on cartels and the opposition of industry which was hoping to 
return to the old legal framework.
A compromise solution was eventually found, but the debate 
lasted until 1957. Erhard had reason to be thankful for the 
American insistence on a strict cartel ban, which he himself 
favored. It is quite possible that without the American pressure 
this principle would have been rejected from the start (Berghahn, 




























































































been compared to a Swiss cheese, prohibiting cartel agreements in 
principle but granting so many exceptions that the ban often 
slipped through the numerous holes (Hardach, 1980, 149). The fact 
remains that the Kartellaesetz went considerably beyond the old 
cartel decree of 1923. An important institutional innovation was 
the creation of a specialized regulatory agency, the federal 
cartel office f Bundeskartellamt) with powers of investigation and 
enforcement.
The treaties of Paris and Rome and the German cartel law are 
rather unique examples of politically motivated external 
pressures leading to major policy innovations. As we have seen, 
American influence, even when backed by the means of persuasion 
available to an occupying power, was not strong enough to 
completely overcome the traditional European tolerance of anti­
competitive behavior. Nonetheless, competition policy in the 
European Community today owes much to those early influences.
5. From Economic to Social Regulation
With the waning of America's "consensual hegemony" in Europe, the 
kind of direct influence evident in the cases just discussed 
became increasingly impossible. However, American models remained 
important for European regulators in the 1960s and 1970s, 
especially in new policy fields like the environment, nuclear 
safety and consumer protection, that is, in social regulation.




























































































of policy making are less obvious than may appear at first sight, 
and call for a few comments.
The leading role of America in economic regulation is not 
difficult to explain, given the ideological reluctance to 
nationalize, on the one hand, and, on the other, the early 
development of mass production and the concentration of economic 
power already well advanced there in the 1880s. Leadership in 
social regulation cannot be explained in the same way. It is 
certainly not the case that in the 1960s the environment was more 
polluted or the consumer less protected in America than in 
Europe.
A suggestive hypothesis is that because America was a 
"welfare laggard" with respect to Europe, it could devote to 
social regulation the financial and political resources which in 
Europe were absorbed by the growing needs of the welfare state. 
Such an explanation has the advantage of calling attention to the 
inherent tension between social regulation and traditional 
welfare policies based on the universal provision of social 
services and large-scale transfer payments. Budgetary limitations 
are one obvious cause of tension: current estimates of the costs 
of various environmental programmes show that these represent a 
significant and growing percentage of GNP in all industrialized 
countries. Sooner or later, therefore, voters have to face the 
choice between expanding or even continuing welfare programmes, 
and devoting sufficient resources to environmental protection and 




























































































However, the roots of the latent conflict between traditional 
social policy and social regulation go deeper than budgetary 
limitations. While the programmes of the welfare state are 
largely concerned with the provision of "merit goods" (housing, 
medical care, education, retirement income, and so on), the aim 
of social regulation is to provide "public goods" like 
environmental protection, product safety or consumer information.
Public provision of merit goods raises delicate issues about 
government paternalism and consumer sovereignty. Moreover, most 
merit goods can also be supplied, often more efficiently, by the 
market. On the other hand, there is general agreement that public 
goods cannot be produced in sufficient quantities by the market. 
Indeed, inadequate supply of public goods is precisely one of the 
types of market failure which social regulation is meant to 
correct. Hence social regulation is politically less 
controversial than social policy in a country like the United 
States where the ideology of free markets and consumer 
sovereignty has always received widespread support.
Be that as it may, American methods and instruments of social 
regulation have been widely imitated in Europe. Examples range 
from the adoption of U.S. emission standards for automobiles and 
of the methodology of environmental impact assessments —  first 
defined by the U.S. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and 
introduced into European legislation about a decade later —  to 




























































































tradable permits to control acid rain by the recent environment 
white paper of the British government.
In his contribution to this issue of The Journal of Public 
Policy. George Hoberg emphasizes the importance of American. 
environmental research for Canadian regulators. European 
regulators, too, have often been "free riders" on the results of 
American regulatory science. Similarly, "activist-driven 
emulation", to use Hoberg's terminology, has played a significant 
role in the development of environmentalist movements in Europe.
Such influences are bound to become less important in the 
future, as environmental policy in Europe, both at the national 
and at the EC level, approaches maturity. Other aspects of the 
American experience, however, will remain significant, indeed, 
may grow in significance. Thus, as the EC moves more squarely 
into the environmental arena, American regulatory federalism —  
which finds expression, for example, in the balance between- 
localized implementation and a strong federal enforcement 
presence —  may present an increasingly relevant model (Mott, 
1990). But before discussing the development of Community 
regulation we must complete our review of American influence on 
regulation in Europe by considering the impact of the 
deregulation movement.
6. The Deregulation of Telecommunications
American regulatory philosophy and practice have continued to 




























































































deregulation in the 1980s. In this period, traditional structures 
of regulation and control felt the pressure of powerful 
ideological, economic and technological forces, and were 
dismantled or radically transformed. This has been often called 
deregulation, but that is a misleading term because often new and 
more explicit regulatory structures are erected in place of the 
old ones (Kay and Vickers, 1990).
Neither in the United States nor in Europe has deregulation 
meant an end to all regulation. In America, airlines have not 
been deregulated with respect to safety, and newly deregulated 
industries have lost their pre-existing statutory immunity from 
the anti-trust laws. In Great Britain, privatization of 
nationalized industries has been followed by monopoly and price 
regulation, see section 2. In short, what is observed in practice 
is never total deregulation, but a combination of deregulation 
and reregulation. Regulatory reform would be a better term for 
this combination, but we shall follow common usage and continue 
to speak of deregulation.
In order to understand the phenomenon of deregulation in 
Europe, two factors should be kept in mind. First, in the 
European context deregulation often means privatization since, as 
we saw, nationalizations were in many cases the functional 
equivalent of American-style regulation. This explains why 
opposition to deregulation has been generally stronger in Europe 
than in the United States. Second, in most countries except. 




























































































a response to far-reaching changes in the technology and 
economics of particular industries. Hence the progress of 
deregulation has varied with the relative importance of those 
industries in the various countries. As a consequence, the impact 
of American deregulation or regulatory reform has been quite 
uneven across countries and industries. The case of 
telecommunications is a good illustration of this complex pattern 
of policy diffusion.
Telecommunications was once a rather simple industry, 
characterized by significant economies of scale and scope and by 
positive externalities generated by larger numbers of 
interconnected users. It was universally accepted that a single 
firm could best exploit the natural monopoly created by telephone 
technology in its early stages. In Europe, national governments 
granted authority over communications to a single monopolist, 
usually the Ministry of Post, Telegraph and Telephone (PTT). In 
the United States, the old AT&T system operated as a private 
regulated monopoly.
For decades, a powerful coalition of interests between PTTs 
(or AT&T) and national suppliers of exchanges and terminal 
equipment prevented any significant changes of the system. 
However, in the 1950s a series of significant technological 
innovations began to transform the industry. Developments in 
microwave communications created for the first time the 
possibility of competition in long-distance services. AT&T could 




























































































in 1969 the Federal Communications Commission let competitors 
into the long-distance market and eventually also into terminal 
equipment.
In the 1970s, technological breakthroughs in digital and 
fiber-optic technologies led to the emergence of high-capacity 
transmission systems, which allow a very significant fall in the 
marginal cost of transmission and create a convergence of 
switching and information processing techniques. Thus, the 
simplicity of the old system was transformed by the appearance of 
two different functions: the information transportation function 
and the processing of this information within the network or by 
computers located at subscribers.
The convergence of these two functions raised troubling 
regulatory questions. Who should produce and sell the services 
made possible by the new technology? The telephone company or the 
firms using the telephone company's facilities? Whose equipment 
should deliver the services? Not surprisingly, the regulatory 
problems and choices posed by technological innovation emerged 
first in the United States, the country where most of the new 
technologies had been developed, and the home of some of the 
world's most advanced financial and service industries and pf the 
biggest and most diversified computer industry (Cowhey, 1990, 
161). A sequence of policy decisions culminating in the 
partitioning of AT&T into a long-distance company and seven 
regional companies established the principle that competition, 




























































































the telecommunications market. Today only local networks and some 
parts of intrastate long-distance communications are subject to 
regulation.
These developments were followed with great interest in 
Europe, where an emergent coalition of computer and service 
industries saw the possibility of challenging the traditional 
postal-industrial complex. The strength of the service sector in 
the United Kingdom —  banking, insurance, trading, publishing and 
media —  may explain why this country was the first one to follow 
the American example. The 1984 Telecommunications Act introduced 
five key principles of public policy in this area:
1. A formal separation of telecommunications from the Post 
Office and establishment of British Telecom (BT) as an 
independent but regulated entity.
2. Establishment of competition in services by permitting 
rival carriers and value-added network services.
3. Privatization of the public network by selling a majority 
of stocks of BT.
4. Liberalization of the market for peripheral equipment.
5. Creation of the regulatory agency OFTEL.
The influence of the American experience is evident, not least in 
the creation of a specialized regulatory agency following 
privatization. As was already indicated in section 2, single- 
industry regulatory bodies like OFTEL are a new institutional 
development in Europe, perhaps the most significant feature of 




























































































Policy development in the Netherlands followed rather similar 
lines. The Steenbergen Commission, established in 1984, 
recommended the transformation of the PTT into a limited 
liability holding company. Separate subsidiary companies were to 
be set up for postal services and for telecommunications. The 
recommendations of the Steenbergen Commission were adopted almost 
without changes by the government and became the basis of the new 
Dutch telecommunications policy. The privatization of the 
telecommunication services became official on January 1, 1989. In 
this case, too, the demonstration effect of the American (and 
British) experience was skillfully and successfully invoked by a 
winning coalition of large users of telecommunications services 
like multinationals, banks, insurance companies, publishers and 
airlines (Hulsink, 1990).
In the rest of the continent the progress of deregulation has 
been much more limited. The German telecommunications law of 1989 
deregulated value-added network services (VANS), terminal 
equipment, mobile radio and low speed satellite communications. 
Telephone services and the core of the physical network, however, 
remain under the monopoly of the Deutsche Bundespost. Similarly 
in France, deregulation covers basically VAN services, terminal 
equipment and mobile communications in the field of private and 
public radiotelephony. The socialist government elected on May 8, 
1988 dropped the idea of transforming the French PTT into a 
holding company. Nonetheless, the law of 30 September 1986 




























































































France, being the first attempt to separate operational and 
regulatory responsibilities (Koebel, 1990, 110-23). The law 
transferred part of the regulatory power held by the Ministry of 
Post and Telecommunications to an independent regulatory 
commission.
The separation of regulatory and operational responsibilities 
has also been urged by the 1987 Green Book on Telecommunications 
of the EC Commission. Hence it may be expected that this 
important principle of regulatory policy will be gradually 
accepted by all the countries of the Community. For the rest, the 
Green Book strikes an uneasy compromise between the position of 
countries like Britain and the Netherlands, on one side, and the 
rather conservative attitude of the majority of member states, on 
the other. It proposes that the provision of terminal equipment 
as well as VAN services should be liberalized within and between 
member countries. Basic services (mainly the telephone service) 
could still be provided as monopoly by the national PTTs; 
however, the arguments about the public interest being served by 
such monopolies should be reviewed periodically.
A detailed analysis of the reasons for the different national 
attitudes toward deregulation would require a separate paper 
(Blankart and Knieps, 1989; Lehmbruch, 1989; Knieps, 1990). A 
full explanation would have to consider the relative strength of 
the "services-information" coalition in different countries, the 
more or less powerful position of the PTT in the cabinet (quite 




























































































trade unions and ministerial bureaucracies, and a host of other 
political and institutional factors. For the general argument of 
this paper, however, it suffices to call attention to the variety 
of factors that can accelerate or retard the diffusion of a 
policy innovation.
7. The EC Commission as Regulator
As we have just seen, policy development in Europe in the field 
of telecommunications has been influenced, up to now, more by the 
American model than by EC regulation. But it would be quite wrong 
to generalize from this particular case. What is true, rather, is 
that it is becoming increasingly impossible to understand the 
domestic policies of member states without taking Community 
legislation into consideration. This is particularly true for 
economic and social regulation. I do not mean to suggest that EC 
regulators attempt to replace or even closely supervise national 
regulators. Such a goal would be politically infeasible at 
present, and would in any case require a large increase of 
specialist staffs in Brussels and the creation of European 
regulatory agencies and inspectorates.
Comparing national and Community rule making in a number of 
policy fields one can see instead two different regulatory 
systems, with the second designed to coordinate and complement 
rather than replace or challenge the first. At the same time, one 
must keep in mind that Community regulation, when agreed by the 




























































































of the intentions of the Commission, national regulators tend to 
lose power in an increasing number of areas (Vipod, 1989).
Political scientists have paid insufficient attention to 
these developments. The vast literature on European integration 
and on policy-making in the European Community contains very few 
studies of the political economy of regulation at the Community 
level. So far, the most significant contributions to the study of 
EC regulation have come from legal scholars who are naturally 
more concerned with procedural questions than with substantive 
policy evaluations or general theoretical explanations. Given the 
importance of Community regulation in so many areas of economic 
and social life, from banking and technical standardization to 
environmental and consumer protection, this scarcity of 
regulatory policy analyses is surprising and can only be 
explained by the absence of a suitable theoretical framework.
Aside from competition policy and measures necessary for the 
integration of national markets, few regulatory policies or 
programmes are specifically mentioned in the Treaty of Rome. The 
transport and energy policies which could have given rise to 
significant regulatory activities, have remained largely 
undeveloped. On the other hand, the agricultural, regional and 
social policies which, together with development aid, absorb 
about 80 per cent of the Community budget, are essentially 
redistributive rather than regulatory in nature.
How, then, can one explain the continuous growth of Community 




























































































the case of environmental protection, an area not even mentioned 
by the Treaty of Rome. In the two decades from 1967 to 1987, when 
the Single European Act finally recognized the authority of the 
Community to legislate in this area, almost 200 directives, 
regulations, and decisions were introduced by the Commission. 
Moreover, the rate of growth of environmental regulation appears 
to have been largely unaffected by the political vicissitudes, 
budgetary crises, and recurrent waves of Europessimism of the 
1970s and early 1980s. From the single directive on preventing 
risks by testing of 1969 (L68/19.3.69) we pass to 10 
directives/decisions in 1975, 13 in 1980, 20 in 1982, 23 in 1984, 
24 in 1985 and 17 in the six months immediately preceding passage 
of the Single European Act.
The case of environmental regulation is particularly 
striking, partly because of the political salience of 
environmental issues, but it is by no means unique. The volume 
and depth of Community regulation in the areas of consumer 
product safety, medical drug testing, banking and financial 
services and, of course, competition law is hardly less 
impressive. In fact, the hundreds of regulatory measures proposed 
by the Commission's White Paper on the completion of the internal 
market only represent the acceleration of a trend set in motion 
decades ago. The continuous growth of supranational regulation is 
not easily explained by traditional theories of Community policy­
making. At most, such theories suggest that the serious 




























































































it easier for the member states, and their representatives in the 
Council, to accept Commission proposals which they have no 
serious intention of applying. The main limitation of this 
argument is that it fails to differentiate between areas where 
policy development has been slow and uncertain (for example, 
transport, energy or research) and areas where significant policy 
development has taken place even in the absence of a clear legal 
basis.
Moreover, existing theories of Community policy-making do not 
usually draw any clear distinction between regulatory and other 
types of policies. Now, an important characteristic of regulatory 
policy making is the limited influence of budgetary limitations 
on the activities of regulators. The size of non-regulatory, 
direct-expenditure programmes is constrained by budgetary 
appropriations and, ultimately, by the size of government tax 
revenues. In contrast, the real costs of most regulatory 
programmes are borne directly by the firms and individuals who 
have to comply with them. Compared with these costs, the 
resources needed to produce the regulations are trivial.
It is difficult to overstate the significance of this 
structural difference between regulatory policies and policies 
involving the direct expenditure of public funds. The distinction 
is particularly important for the analysis of Community policy­
making, since not only the economic, but also the political and 





























































































As already noted, the financial resources of the Community 
go, for the most part, to the Common Agricultural Policy and to a 
handful of redistributive programmes. The remaining resources are 
insufficient to support large scale initiatives in areas lilje 
industrial policy, energy, research, or technological innovation. 
Given this constraint, the only way for the Commission to 
increase its role is to expand the scope of its regulatory 
activities.
Thus any satisfactory explanation of the remarkable growth of 
Community regulation must take into account both the desire of 
the Commission to increase its influence —  a fairly 
safe behavioral assumption —  and the possibility of escaping 
budgetary constraints by resorting to regulatory policy-making. 
But this is only part of the explanation. Another important 
element is the interest of multi-national, export-oriented 
industries in avoiding inconsistent and progressively more ■ 
stringent regulations in various EC and non-EC countries. 
Community regulation can eliminate or at least reduce this risk.
A similar phenomenon has been observed in the United States, 
where certain industries, faced with the danger of a significant 
loss of markets through state and local legislation, have 
strongly supported federal regulation ("preemptive federalism"). 
For example, the American automobile industry had good reasons to 
prefer federal regulation of air pollution because of the threat 
posed by different and inconsistent air pollution standards and 




























































































which one state legislature after another would set more and more 
stringent emission standards without regard to the costs and 
technical difficulties involved ... Federal legislation was 
preferable to state legislation —  particularly if federal 
standards were set based on technical presentations to an 
administrative agency rather than through symbolic appeals to 
cost-externalizing politicians" (Elliott et al., 1985, 331).
Thus the car industry, which during the early 1960s had 
successfully opposed federal emission standards for motor 
vehicles, abruptly reversed its position in mid-1965: provided 
that the federal standards would be set by a regulatory agency, 
and provided that they would preempt any state standards more 
stringent than California's, the industry would support federal 
legislation.
Analogous reasons explain the preference for Community 
solutions of some powerful and well-organized European 
industries. Consider, for example, the "Sixth Amendment" of 
directive 67/548 on the classification, packaging, and labelling 
of dangerous substances. This amending Directive 79/831 does not 
prevent member states from including more substances within the 
scope of national regulations than are required by the Directive 
itself. In fact, the British Health and Safety Commission 
proposed to go further than the Directive by bringing 
intermediate products within the scope of national regulation. 
This, however, was opposed by the chemical industry, represented 




























































































national regulation should not impose greater burdens on British 
industry than the Directive placed on its competitors. The CIA 
view prevailed thus ensuring that in this as in many other cases, 
Community regulation would in fact set the maximum as well as the 
minimum standard for national regulation (Haigh, 1984).
Similarly, German negotiators pressed for a European-wide 
scheme that would also provide the framework for an acceptable 
regulatory programme at home. German firms, concerned about 
overzealous enforcement by national inspectors and afraid of an 
environmentally conscious public opinion at home, wanted a full 
and explicit statement of their obligations to be defined at the 
EC level. Moreover, with more than 50 per cent of Germany's 
chemical trade going to other EC countries, German businessmen 
and government officials wished to avoid the commercial obstacles 
that would arise from divergent national regulations (Brickman, 
Jasanoff and Ilsen, 1985).
The European chemical industry had another reason for 
supporting Community regulation. In 1976 the United States, 
without consulting their commercial partners, enacted the Toxic 
Substances Control Act (TSCA). The new regulation represented a 
serious threat for European exports to the lucrative American 
market. A European response to TSCA was clearly needed, and the 
Community was the logical forum for fashioning such a response.
An EC-wide system of testing new chemical substances could serve 
as a model for negotiating standardized requirements covering the 




























































































the Community to speak with one voice in discussions with the 
United States and other OECD countries, and has strengthened the 
position of the European chemical industry in ensuring that the 
new American regulation does not create obstacles to its exports. 
There is little doubt that the ability of the Commission to enter 
into discussions with the USA has been greatly enhanced by the 
Directive, and it is unlikely that each European country on its 
own could do so effectively (Brickman, Jasanoff and Ilsen, 1985, 
277) .
At the beginning of this section we stated that it is 
becoming increasingly difficult to understand the domestic 
policies of member states without taking Community policies into 
consideration. The most obvious impact of Community regulations 
on national policies is a transfer of legislative competence to 
the Community since the principle of supremacy of Community law 
bars member states from passing laws inconsistent with the 
relevant EC directive. There are less obvious but no less 
important ways in which Community regulations can influence 
national policies. Thus "[tjhe confrontation of national policy 
makers with the new regulatory initiatives at the Community level 
may also have the effect of reorienting the national thinking on 
environmental priorities and regulating strategies and 
influencing national policies in areas not covered by those 
initiatives. On the other hand, the Community can provide a "back 
door" method for adopting measures that would not be adopted by 




























































































Just as policy making in the member states can no longer be 
explained exclusively in national terms, so it is impossible to 
understand the development of Community regulatory policy making 
as if the only important political actors were the national 
governments represented in the Council. Models of this type have 
led, for example, to the incorrect prediction that environmental 
process regulation would not occur in a system requiring 
unanimous consent of the member states, because states with 
relatively low standards would find it against their interest to 
agree to higher standards (Rehbinder and Stewart, 1985). As the 
example of the 1979 directive on toxic substances shows, such 
state-centered models overlook many important factors such as the 
variety of industrial interests within one country; the 
advantages of "preemptive federalism" for multinational or 
export-oriented firms, both for avoiding inconsistent national 
regulations, and for shifting regulatory decision-making to a 
less political, more technocratic arena; the role of public 
opinion which makes the adoption of "lowest common denominator" 
standards increasingly difficult; the importance of speaking with 
one voice in negotiating international regulatory issues; and 
last but not least the ability of the Commission to regulate even 
without adequate legal and budgetary resources.
8. Regulatory Convergence through Mutual Recognition?
Despite the impressive growth of Community regulation in the 




























































































the amount of work that remained to be done was such that the 
goal of completing the internal market by 1993 could not be 
achieved by relying exclusively on the traditional harmonization 
approach. In the words of the Commission (1985, 18) "experience 
has shown that the alternative of relying on a strategy baséd 
totally on harmonization would be over-regulatory, would take a 
long time to implement, would be inflexible and could stifle 
innovation".
Harmonization, rather than unification, of national 
regulations had been the main objective of the Community in its 
first 25 years. Harmonization is the adjustment of national rules 
to the requirements of a common market. Its characteristic 
instrument is the directive because this instrument only 
specifies the regulatory objectives to be achieved, leaving the 
choice of methods to the member states.
To overcome the limitations of the traditional approach, the 
White Paper on the completion of the internal market introduced a 
new strategy with the following key elements: mutual recognition
of national regulations and standards; legislative harmonization 
to be restricted by laying down essential health and safety 
requirements which will be obligatory on all Member States; 
gradual replacement of national product specifications by 
European standards issued by the Comité Européen de la 
Normalisation (CEN) or by sectoral European organizations such as 





























































































In essence, the White Paper proposes a conceptual distinction 
between matters where harmonization is essential and those where 
it is sufficient that there be mutual recognition of the 
equivalence of the various basic requirements laid down under 
national law. This line of reasoning was first introduced by the 
European Court of Justice in the famous Cassis de Diion judgment 
of 1979. The Court had stated that a member state may not in 
principle prohibit the sale in its territory of a product 
lawfully produced and marketed in another member state even if 
this product is produced according to technical or quality 
requirements which differ from those imposed on its domestic 
products —  except when the prohibition is justified by the need 
to ensure effective fiscal supervision, to protect public health 
or the environment, or to ensure the fairness of financial 
transactions.
Given the cumbersome nature of the Community decision-making 
process, the new approach has considerable advantages. Unlike 
harmonization, mutual recognition does not involve the transfer 
of powers to the Community but, at most, restricts the freedom of 
action of member states. Moreover, the emphasis on mutual 
recognition avoids all the difficulties linked to the necessity 
of drafting directives so as to suit the substantive concerns of 
twelve different actors or the particular requirements of their 
legal system.
In fact, the idea of mutual recognition is so attractive that 




























































































expiration of the 1992 deadline in the absence of harmonization 
provisions in a given sector. Because of the unanimous opposition 
of the member states, a milder version of this proposal was 
adopted. Article 100B of the Single Act provides for mutual 
recognition to be speeded up in the last year of the transition 
period to fulfil the commitment to complete the internal market 
by the end of 1992: on the basis of an inventory drawn up by the 
Commission, the Council will decide on the equivalence between 
specific national provisions (Dehousse, 1988, 326).
It remains to be seen whether the principle of mutual 
recognition will suffice to meet the many regulatory challenges 
posed by an integrated European market (Majone, 1989a). For 
example, this approach cannot handle negative externalities'that 
transcend national boundaries, nor can it solve problems that 
have proved too difficult even for the traditional approach 
through harmonization, as in the case of pre-market testing of 
new medical drugs (Kaufer, 1990). One could also argue that 
mutual recognition is incompatible with the logic of an 
integrated market since this logic cannot allow the achievement 
of the single market to be brought into question by unilateral 
measures of member states.
At any rate, mutual recognition is not an end in itself. The 
assumption is that this approach will lead at first to a 
competition among national rules but eventually to regulatory 
convergence. At least in some areas, such as regulation aimed at 




























































































competition is an efficient way of assessing the costs and 
benefits of different methods of regulation. By providing 
opportunities for experimentation and social learning, 
competition among regulators raises the standard of all 
regulation and drives out rules which offer protection that 
consumers do not, in fact, require (Kay and Vickers, 1990, 244). 
Thus it is likely that in the near future the principle of mutual 
recognition and the resulting competition among rules will 
provide a new and important source of policy innovation and 
emulation, not only within the EC but also internationally.
To illustrate the possible international implications of 
mutual recognition, I shall briefly compare the regulation of 
banking and financial services in the United States and in the 
European Community (after January 1, 1993). Two basic elements of 
banking regulation in America are the McFadden Act of 1927 and 
the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. Both statutes have been amended 
on several occasions since they were passed.
The McFadden Act prohibits a national bank from branching 
outside of its home state, and permits it to branch within its 
home state only to the extent that banks chartered by that state 
may branch. Thus, interstate branching is expressely prohibited 
for all national banks and is virtually impossible for state- 
chartered banks because no state permits its chartered banks to 
branch beyond state boundaries, or permits banks located in other 




























































































The Glass-Steagall Act attempts to separate commercial 
banking from investment banking by prohibiting, with a few 
exceptions, any institution from conducting at the same time a 
deposit-taking business and an investment banking business. In 
addition, the act prohibits member banks of the Federal Reserve 
System from affiliating with securities firms, again with some 
exceptions.
As a result of these restrictions, the financial system in 
the United States has evolved into a structure characterized by a 
very large number of commercial banks, most of which are quite 
small; by a strict separation of commercial banking and 
securities firms, with different federal authorities to regulate 
them; and by the virtual absence of interstate branching by 
commercial banks but almost unrestricted branching by securities 
firms (Golembe and Holland, 1990, 91-92).
Consider now the situation in the European Community after 
January 1, 1993. The regulatory framework which will apply to 
European banks at that time is provided by the Second Directive 
on Credit Institutions (often referred to, not quite correctly, 
as Second Banking Directive) and by three more narrow directives 
concerned with the definition of a bank's capital, with the 
solvency ratios banks should adopt, and with procedures for 
winding up credit institutions. These three technical directives 
aim to harmonize standards in key areas, not provide mutual 
recognition. They are, nonetheless, quite important for they 




























































































place. As such they show that harmonization and mutual 
recognition are not simply alternatives but are, in important 
respects, complementary (Vipod, 1989, 14-15).
The cornerstone of EC banking regulation is the Second 
Directive. The essential elements of this directive are the 
concept of a single banking licence and the list of permissible 
banking activities. The list is very broad and includes 
activities, such as dealing in and underwriting securities, which 
American banks are prevented from entering into by Glass- 
Steagall. Not only is the list of permissible banking activities 
broad, but it can be updated by the Commission to reflect the 
emergence of new banking services.
Within the regulatory framework provided by the Second 
Directive and by the other directives mentioned above, a European 
bank will need a single license from its home country to be 
allowed to establish branches or directly market financial 
services in any other EC country without further authorizations 
or controls. With very few exceptions, the host country in which 
the bank provides its services has no power to seek further 
authorization or exercise supervision. This is, of course, a 
direct consequence of the principle of mutual recognition which 
inspires the entire directive.
Even this brief description of the two systems of regulation 
is sufficient to convey an idea of the radically different 
approaches followed by American and European regulators. The 




























































































increasing internationalization of financial markets and with the 
important role of the United States and the European Community in 
such markets.
The mutual recognition approach, applied to international 
banking, would require the United States to permit European banks 
to carry on the same scope of business in the US as their home 
country permits them to carry on in Europe. This would place 
American banks at a considerable disadvantage, unless the 
restrictions imposed by the Glass-Steagall and the McFadden Acts 
were greatly liberalized.
The European Community has repeatedly argued in favor of 
greater liberalization and international harmonization of banking 
regulation. Some progress has already been made, for example the 
adoption by the U.S. and Japan as well as the EC, of the risk- 
based capital requirements set by the Basle Committee on Banking 
Regulations and Supervisory Practices. Even stronger forms of 
regulatory convergence may emerge in the near future. According 
to some American experts, if the savings and loans crisis had not 
erupted to dominate all other financial market issues, the push 
coming out of reciprocity demands from the EC might have been the 
deciding factor in amending the Glass-Steagall Act in 1988 or
1989. It is also suggested that in the long run European banking 
regulation will induce a complete restructuring of the US 
financial system, meaning the disappearance of the limitations 
imposed by present American regulations (Golembe and Holland,




























































































defend, say, the prohibition of branching between American states 
when the EC permits virtually unrestricted branching between 
countries?
Even the balance of power among federal regulatory and 
supervisory agencies may be affected by policy developments in 
the EC. If a European system of central banks (Eurofed) will be 
established with responsibility for the coordination of banking 
supervision policies, the Federal Reserve Board would seem to be 
the obvious candidate for the same job in the United States. In 
this way the Reserve Board would move into a dominant position 
within the federal structure, with the other federal regulatory 
bodies —  the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation —  playing subsidiary roles 
or even becoming part of the Federal Reserve itself.
9. Conclusion
In his discussion of lesson-drawing, Richard Rose identifies two 
opposite schools of thought. According to theories of perfect 
fungibility, different governments faced with the same problem 
respond with the same or similar policies; while theories of 
total blockage maintain that every polity presents a unique 
configuration of cultural values, institutions and resources, so 
that it is impossible to transfer policy solutions from one' 
country to another, one city to another, or from the past to the 




























































































policies and policy instruments can be transferred virtually 
intact from one context to another (Rose, 1990).
The cases examined in this paper contradict the simplicity of 
the ideal types of total fungibility or blockage. As we have 
seen, utilization of pre-existing models, far from being 
impossible or even unusual, is a common feature of policy 
innovation. Indeed, the very concept of policy innovation should 
be used with the same care and qualifications with which the 
historians introduce their periodisations and modes of dating. 
Even the Sherman Antitrust Act, a significant innovation by any 
standard, was fashioned of materials borrowed from the common 
law, to the point that some scholars have argued that the Act 
does nothing more than to declare principles of policy and law 
that have been observed continuously during many centuries of 
Anglo-American legal tradition. As William Letwin (1965, 15) has 
written, the common law was very unwieldly material from which to 
construct a law to control large modern corporations, but nothing 
better was available. The common law on monopolies provided some 
guiding principles as well as precedents in which the framers of 
the Sherman Act could find a certain amount of hope.
On the other hand, historical precedents or foreign models 
are seldom, if ever, literally translated into current policy. 
More or less extensive adaptations to a particular political, 
institutional and economic context are normally required. We have 
seen that American anti-trust policy was an important source of 




























































































for example, striking similarities between certain articles of 
the Sherman Act and the articles on competition policy of the 
Paris and Rome treaties. However, the drafters of these treaties 
and of the German Kartellaesetz had to modify the American model 
to take into account the traditional European tolerance of anti­
competitive behaviour, see section 4 above.
The relevant question, therefore, is not whether policy 
imitation is possible or desirable —  reliance on pre-existing 
models is a practical necessity given the resource and time 
constraints under which policy makers operate —  but why a 
particular model becomes influential at a given time. At the 
beginning of this paper it was suggested that models emanating 
from economically and politically powerful countries are most 
likely to be the objects of emulation. We can now refine this 
statement by noting that the force exerted by a foreign model on 
domestic policy can be of two type: push and pull.
American influence on the development of competition policy 
in Europe at the end of the second world war exemplifies the 
first type. Some of the examples of American influence on 
Canadian environmental regulation discussed in Hoberg's paper in 
this issue, follow into the same category. On the other hand, 
American deregulation has attracted the attention of European and 
other policy-makers without direct pressures, except those 
transmitted through the markets. The probable impact of EC 
banking regulation on the American regulatory structure would be 




























































































Naturally, these are analytical distinctions. In practice, 
policy development is often the resultant of both push and pull 
forces. Thus, the German cartel law reflects the American 
pressures on the German government but also the attraction 
exerted by American anti-trust policy on Erhard and other 
economic liberals. The recent history of Eastern Europe 
demonstrates that foreign models transmitted only by push cannot 
be viable in the long run.
The interaction of push and pull forces in the transfer of 
policy models also helps to understand how the principle of 
mutual recognition, discussed in section 8, can operate in 
practice. This principle introduces new possibilities of policy 
learning through competition among national rules. However, in 
the absence of generally accepted standards, darwinian 
competition may fail to drive out bad models and produce instead 
convergence toward weak forms of regulation. In practice, the 
common standards have to be imposed on all competitors by some 
supranational body such as the European Community. This is why we 
said that harmonization and mutual recognition are not so much 
alternative as complementary approaches. In this, as in many 
other cases, push and pull have to be combined in order to 
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